We evaluate the presence and magnitude of moral hazard in Japan's public long-term care insurance (LTCI) market. Using monthly LTCI claim records from January 2006 to December 2015 linked to concurrent death records, we construct a sample by propensity score matching insured individuals who co-pay 10% of their fees to those with no required copayments, and we implement fixed-effect estimations. We find that a ten-percentage-point reduction in the copayment rate increases monthly costs by 10.2 thousand yen, corresponding to a price elasticity of about − 0.1. Insured individuals with no copayments tend to use more services and have more utilization days than those with copayments do. Furthermore, we find that insured individuals who die from cerebral (myocardial) infarction increase their service use more in response to a reduction in the copayment rate than those who die from senility do, indicating a positive association between ex-ante health risks and ex-post service use. We verify that a cost-sharing adjustment is a valid solution for soaring LTCI expenditures. These findings could provide broad implications for the rapidly aging world.
Introduction
In health economics, moral hazard refers to an increase in service use for a given real level of need when (public) insurance coverage leads to a lower realized price [1] . This issue is repeatedly observed in health insurance (HI) markets, in which insured individuals with lower cost sharing have greater demand, as measured by physician visits, inpatient days, and so on [2, 3] . The magnitude of moral hazard provides valid evidence for the effectiveness of policies that attempt to reduce public HI expenditures [4] .
Whereas many studies focus on moral hazard in HI markets, far fewer studies evaluate moral hazard in the longterm care insurance (LTCI) markets [5] . This discrepancy may arise largely because LTCI markets-even in developed countries like the United States or Germany-remain relatively small [6, 7] . In the context of global aging, however, LTCI markets are expected to expand rapidly in coming years, increasing the importance of investigating moral hazard in such markets.
In Japan-the world's oldest country-LTCI has already become a major component of the social security system. Japan introduced mandatory public LTCI with universal coverage in 2000 in response to the large demand for longterm care among the older population [8] . About 21.5 million elderly people (i.e., 97.2% of the population aged 65 and above) were enrolled during the launch, 84.4% of whom used the services within the year, costing roughly US$ 32.4 billion [9] . Since then, the market has expanded further and faster than those of other nations have. In 2012, Japan's public LTCI expenditures (US$ 792.9 billion) were three times as much as the total long-term care expenditures in the United States (US$ 219.9 billion) and six times greater Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1019 8-019-01041 -6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
than the Medicaid expenditures (US$ 134.1 billion) [10] . These soaring expenditures are of great concern for LTCI's fiscal sustainability [11] .
In HI markets, a standard cost-reducing policy is increasing cost sharing. Likewise, from August 2015 onward, the LTCI copayment rate in Japan was increased from 10 to 20% among insured individuals with incomes comparable to those of the current workforce [8] . This arrangement reflects the belief that moral hazard also occurs in LTCI markets. To the best of our knowledge, however, no empirical evidence exists to support the validity of such a cost-sharing arrangement. If the demand for long-term care is completely price inelastic, an increase in the copayment rate is not necessarily effective for containing public expenditures. Accordingly, evidence regarding the existence of moral hazard in LTCI markets is urgently needed to develop further LTCI costreduction policies.
Evidence for HI markets cannot necessarily be applied to LTCI markets because individuals covered by LTCI are typically frailer, presumably owing to health issues, than individuals covered by HI are. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare [12] , medical expenditures per capita for people over 65 (i.e., individuals covered by LTCI) were 724.4 thousand yen in 2014, more than twice the population average cost (321.1 thousand yen). Thus, service use in the two markets could be affected differently by a crucial personal preference: cautiousness. In HI, cautiousness correlates negatively with medical service use for a given cost-sharing level [4, 13] . Cautious individuals covered by HI tend to increase their investments for improving their health, thus reducing medical service use. In the case of LTCI, however, cautiousness might instead stimulate service use owing to the frailty of insured individuals. Cautious and frail individuals may overestimate their needs and, thus, may require services more frequently.
Moreover, long-term care needs are more predictable than the demand for medical services is. For instance, Ellis and McGuire [14] evaluate the predictability of various types of healthcare services and confirm that the most predictable service is hospice. From a lifetime perspective, long-term care should be as predictable as hospice, as it appears to be common knowledge that people need long-term care later in life and hospice at the end of life. In the short run, the type and amount of long-term care are determined before provision. The low uncertainty of long-term care needs provides room for insured individuals to manipulate their service demands and also enables insurers to control service provision easily. Taken together, these properties suggest that LTCI may yield a different equilibrium from that of HI.
In addition, the corresponding evidence for private LTCI may not apply to Japan's public LTCI because public insurance is theoretically more likely than private insurance to engender riskier ex-ante health behaviors, and riskier ex-ante health behaviors may be positively associated with ex-post service use [15] . However, the empirical evidence for this association is mixed in the case of public HI. Some studies show that a reduction in preventative care may cause an increase in healthcare [16, 17] , whereas others do not find significant evidence [18] . Accordingly, it is worthwhile to clarify this association in the context of Japan's public LTCI with universal coverage, mandatory enrollment, and uniform service prices.
In sum, moral hazard in Japan's public LTCI may differ from that identified in other HI and private LTCI markets. Thus, the major objective of this study is evaluating the presence and magnitude of moral hazard using national LTCI claims records. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces Japan's public LTCI and the moral hazard therein. Section 3 presents the data, measurements, and estimation strategies. Section 4 presents the results, Sect. 5 discusses the results, and Sect. 6 concludes.
Moral hazard in Japan's LTCI
Japan is facing a drastic increase in elderly people requiring long-term care, and their needs can no longer be satisfied within households given the rising life expectancy, shrinking number of multi-generation households, and increasing number of working women [8] . Public LTCI is, therefore, seen as the solution. As shown in Fig. 1 , all Japanese individuals aged 40 and over are mandatorily enrolled and are categorized as primary (ages 65 and over) or secondary insured (ages 40-64). Insured individuals pay monthly premiums to their municipalities through deductions or individual collections. 1 Municipalities, as insurers, are responsible for managing the LTCI budgets, conducting eligibility tests upon request, and designating long-term care business operators.
An insured individual, aware of his care needs, applies for long-term care eligibility by undergoing an eligibility test held by his municipality of residence (step 1). This test is scheduled in two stages (see Appendix A): an interview based on a 74-item questionnaire on physical and mental functions and a final judgement by the Certification Committee of Long-Term Care Needs [19] . The first-stage interview assigns the individual a tentative care level 2 that then 1 For primary insured individuals, premiums are collected through pension deductions or individual collections. For secondary insured individuals, premiums are collected together with HI premiums. 2 The care level is categorized as one of seven need levels from the mildest support required at level 1 (SL1) to the most severe care at level 5 (CL5). See Appendix A for details.
is judged by the committee members 3 following a protocol issued by the central government. Importantly, the test exclusively evaluates the insured's health-related functions without testing the insured individual's socio-economic status (SES). 4 In particular, household income is irrelevant to eligibility or to the care level to which the insured individual is assigned. Because household income is the key eligibility criterion for public assistance 5 -eligible individuals can use long-term care services for free-the LTCI eligibility test can hardly detect the ex-post variations in service use caused by different levels of cost sharing.
Using careful judgement, the committee officially assigns a care level to the insured individual and notifies him (step 2). Then, eligible insured individuals construct plans to use long-term care services based on their care levels (step 3). 6 They may construct these plans by themselves or with their families, but care managers are most likely to provide support in choosing a care plan. Some care managers are affiliated with community care centers designated by municipalities, whereas others are employed by either non-profit or for-profit service providers. 7 Care managers, accordingly, provide information on long-term care services and make reservations for services later on, if necessary (step 4). Then, based on this care plan, insured individuals are Fig. 1 Structure of Japan's public long-term care insurance. Refined by authors based on a figure from Explanation of long-term care insurance system (p. 9) by the Social Insurance Institute 2018 (in Japanese). ISBN978-4-7894-2594-0$4 3 The committee consists of third-party physicians, nurses, and social workers. 4 The only information not related to health status regards living conditions (e.g., lift availability and co-residence). The investigator (a municipality official who organizes the interview) can leave comments in a column at the end of the questionnaire, labeled "Please leave a note here about applicant's living condition if necessary." The MHLW explicitly mentions that such information is "used for reference purposes only" and is "not used to determine/change care levels" [19, p. 18] . 5 See Appendix B for details on the eligibility process for public assistance and the contents of the assistance. 6 The care plan consists of what and how many services to use within a month. 7 It is important to clarify that the care managers affiliated with the care centers are independent of service suppliers, and, thus, they are unlikely to recommend that insured individuals expand their care plans for financial purposes. Instead, it is highly risky for them to do so, because municipalities will rescind their designations and make monetary dispositions if they are aware of foul play. In contrast, care managers employed by either non-profit or for-profit service providers may have incentives to induce demand for long-term care. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the type of care manager (independent versus employee) support used to construct each individual's care plan. Alternatively, we use the propensity score matching procedure (see Table 1 ) to adjust for the type of care manager by balancing the type of service supplier providing care most frequently, as an insured individual is most likely to be supported by a care manager who is affiliated with service provider that he uses most frequently.
Table 1
Covariate balances in pre-and post-matching samples % bias is a summary indicator of the distribution of the standardized difference in the overall sample mean across treatments. Support required individuals are excluded because none of them is institutionalized at the first service use free to contract with any service suppliers to use at-home or institutional services with 10% copayments (step 5-6). Finally, community care centers and suppliers submit electronic claims to municipalities for corresponding reimbursements (step 7). As mentioned above, those with LTCI who are also eligible for public assistance (PA) are exempt from the 10% copayment scheme. According to the Public Assistance Act, long-term care services are provided free of charge for needy individuals who are unable to maintain a minimum standard of living owing to poverty (see Appendix B). In other words, such individuals are de facto fully insured. Thus, for a given level of need, insured individuals eligible for PA may be motivated to require more services than those without PA, who share 10% of the fee, require. However, the higher service demand among insured individuals with PA (if any) may also be caused by other confounding factors. Individuals receiving PA generally have unfavorable SES that are positively associated with service use. 8 Simply estimating differences between individuals with and without PA would, therefore, overestimate moral hazard.
Some studies use the instrumental variables (IV) method to address this issue [21] . In our case, a plausible instrument could be the exogenous household income threshold that determines PA eligibility. However, this threshold is too ambiguous to incorporate because it varies substantially across certain household characteristics, such as the number and age structure of household members that are unobservable in our datasets. Recent experimental studies tackle this endogeneity by randomly assigning a cost-sharing level. Finkelstein et al. [22] find higher service demand with lower cost sharing in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), as do Manning et al. [23] in the Rand HIE. Unfortunately, no experimentation has been permitted within Japan's LTCI market thus far. Alternatively, in this study, we purify the magnitude of moral hazard in two steps. First, we apply the propensity score matching method (PSM) to balance the observable heterogeneity across PA eligibility, and we then apply the fixed-effect (FE) model to control for time-invariant and unobserved confounding variables (e.g., working history and past educational achievement, which hardly change in old age) that are associate with both PA eligibility and ex-post service use.
Data and methods

Data
We use monthly LTCI claims from January 2006 to December 2015. The data comprise 120 months' claims with over 814 million records covering the entire Japanese LTCI market during the period. For each insured individual, the claims thoroughly record the type and volume of services used in every month and summarize the corresponding costs. However, the claims document fairly limited individual characteristics, specifically, gender, age, (in)eligibility date, and care level at service use. We further link the claims to the concurrent death records from vital statistics using a set of identifiers: gender, birth date, death date (ineligibility date in claims), and municipality of residence. An additional set of individual characteristics (e.g., the cause of death, etc.) is available from the death record.
Around 35% of insured individuals eligible for long-term care as of January 1, 2006 eventually become ineligible within the observation periods. For these individuals, three scenarios may occur: becoming independent, moving to another municipality, 9 or dead. Over 83% of those who lose eligibility are identified in the death record. Accordingly, we construct a longitudinal sample of 1,478,081 insured individuals (n) who have death records (i.e., who died) during the period, with 38,100,370 monthly claims (N).
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Measurements
Public assistance
Insured individuals are identified as receiving PA if they utilize services with no copayment at least once during the 120 months, and insured individuals without PA are those who continuously co-pay 10% of their fees (see Appendix C.1). We detect about 14,000 insured individuals who receive PA. Once insured individuals are transferred into the zero copayment scheme, they are rarely transferred back to the 10% copayment scheme, probably because elderly individuals are unlikely to work, and work status is closely related to household income. 11 9 An insured individual moving to a new municipality loses his eligibility in his previous place of residence and obtains new eligibility in his current place of residence. However, the probability of an elderly and disabled individual moving is very low. 10 In addition, we remove all the claims of insured individuals with incomes comparable to those of current workers, who transferred from the 10% to the 20% copayment scheme as of August 2015. 11 In 2017, about half of the population receiving PA in Japan were over 65 [24] . The proportions of those aged 40-49 (10.1%), 30-39 (5.5%), and 20-29 (2.8%) were much lower, probably because such
Moral hazard
Five variables are used to measure the potential greater use of services among individuals receiving PA: total monthly long-term care cost, monthly types of service used, total monthly days of service use, monthly costs per type of service, and monthly costs per service day. The types and days of service use capture a potential quantitative aspect-individuals receiving PA may require additional services or use services more frequently. The cost per type of service and per service day, alternatively, measure a potential qualitative aspect-these individuals use better quality services with higher prices.
Individual characteristics
The individual characteristics are divided into two groups for the PSM and FE estimations. Because PSM depends on predicted likelihood of becoming part of the PA group, the included covariates should be unaffected by or determined prior to PA eligibility [25] . Covariates in the death records are, therefore, excluded because they are highly likely to be measured after the PA eligibility decision.
Furthermore, the PSM is based on a cross-sectional dataset constructed by extracting the records in the month in which each individual used long-term care for the first time (see Appendix C.2 and Table 1 ). Most insured individuals, regardless of whether they receive PA later on, copay 10% of their fee at their first service use. The covariates for PSM thus satisfy the condition of being predetermined. Specifically, we use gender as well as age, care level; the type of care used most frequently, the corresponding type of service supplier, and the region of residence at the first service use as covariates. In particular, we expect that the most frequently used care and the corresponding supplier type should capture the individuals' family structure, which is a necessary, but unobservable control. According to Tokunaga et al. [26] , household composition is a strong determinant of the type and volume of long-term care service use. We expect matching over the service-related covariates to narrow imbalances in unobserved family structures between individuals with and without PA.
After performing PSM, we focus only on the individuals that are matched successfully in the cross-sectional dataset, and we identify them in the original longitudinal dataset for FE estimation (see Appendix C.3 and Table 3 ). In addition to the covariates used for PSM, we also include the cause of death, 12 operation and anatomy at death, marital status at death, place of death, and work status at death, which are found in the death records.
Specific causes of death
Based on the ICD-10, we further stratify the FE estimation according to the four leading causes of death. Senilitycaused deaths among the elderly population are highly likely to stem from functional declines owing to the aging of organ systems, whereas deaths caused by cerebral or myocardial infarctions are more often associated with smoking, a highsalt diet, or other risky health behaviors earlier in life [27] . Among others, pneumonia-one of the top three causes of death among the elderly Japanese population-may be associated with complications or comorbidities of other diseases or may occur simply because of aging [28] . Accordingly, we regard pneumonia-caused death as a benchmark for the ex-ante risk behavior of the insured and assume that senilitycaused deaths indicate low risk behaviors and cerebral or myocardial infarctions to represent comparatively riskier health self-management.
Estimation strategy
Propensity score matching at the first service use
We conduct PSM using a cross-sectional dataset of covariates at the first service use. As below, we match individuals with and without PA in terms of their likelihood of becoming part of the PA group, that is, the propensity score p i of insured individual i:
Vectors L i stands for the care level, S i is the type of services used most frequently, Z i represents other characteristics, and P i is the type of supplier providing the most frequently used care. We include all possible interactions between L i and S i to account for observed heterogeneity, and i is the error term. We utilize nearest-one-neighbor (NN1) matching such that an individual receiving PA is matched with the nearest non-PA individual within a caliper of 0.001 of the propensity score [29] . Once an individual without PA is matched, he is excluded from the list for further matching (i.e., we preform matching without replacement). In addition, we also conduct NN1 matching allowing replacement and nearest-five-neighbor (NN5) matching for the sake of (1)
12 Causes of death are classified into 13 categories refined according to the international statistical classification of diseases and related health problems 10th Revision (ICD-10).
individuals have more opportunities to work and, thus, are more likely to alleviate their poverty.
Footnote 11 (continued) robustness. We impose the common support condition for PSM.
Post-matching fixed-effect estimation
We then extract the matched individuals from the original longitudinal dataset and apply an FE model to control for the time-invariant characteristics of individual i in month t:
where we take the natural log of the outcome Y , i.e., the five measurements of moral hazard.r is the variable of interest (i.e., the copayment rate). Vectors X and D indicate the covariates in the claims and death records, respectively, t controls for the time-fixed effect,u it is the error term, and i is the unobserved individual-fixed effect. Importantly, D is included only with regard to its interaction with r , because it consists of time-invariant covariates at death and, thus, would be omitted from the FE regression. In the post-matching samples that allow replacement (i.e., NN1 and NN5), the estimations are weighted by the matching frequency. Table 1 summarizes the balances of covariates before and after matching. We observe notable differences in the prematching sample. For instance, individuals receiving PA require visiting homecare more often than individuals without PA, but they are less likely to be institutionalized. The imbalance of in the type of care used most frequently is consistent across care levels. Moreover, individuals with PA require care more (less) often from homecare stations (medical facilities) than those without PA do. These imbalances indicate the potential SES differences across PA eligibility. All of these systematic differences are eliminated in the postmatching samples (i.e., mean bias < 5%), regardless of the matching method [30] . 13 
Results
Post-matching covariate balances
Descriptive statistics in the post-matching sample
Focusing on individuals matched successfully by NN1 without replacement, Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for FE estimation. Because most of the covariates are dichotomous or categorized, we report the numbers of observations and corresponding proportions at the insured and (2) ln Y it = 0 + 1 r it + X it 2 + r it X it 3 + r it D i 4 + t + i + u it , insured-month (i.e., claim) levels, respectively. Age, incorporated but not shown in the table, has an overall mean of 84.01 years and an overall standard deviation of 8.53 years.
Intuitively, half the matched individuals receive PA and, thus, use services with zero copayment at least once across the periods. Nevertheless 96.7% of the individuals copay 10% of the fee at least once, indicating that most individuals receiving PA are transferred into the zero copayment scheme in a specific month during the period. In fact, they tend to become eligible for PA during late stages, as only 18.9% of claims are fully paid by municipalities. About 47% of insured individuals are male, and they are less likely to use services than women are. Over 42% of individuals qualify as needing care level 2 at least once, and claims are also the highest at this level. Visiting homecare is the most popular service-around 65% of individuals have ever required it, accounting for 34.75% of claims. Regarding the cause of death, neoplasms or diseases of blood is the first leading cause, 14 followed by the diseases of the circulatory and respiratory systems. The top-three ranking at the claims level, however, is inversed. Individuals suffering from diseases of the circulatory or respiratory systems require services more frequently than those with neoplasms do, probably because of their higher survival rates and longer durations of service use. The majority of individuals in the sample are widowed (47.36%) or married (42.20%) at death, and widowed individuals have more frequent service use. Hospitals are the most common place of death, and around 70% of individuals do not work at their time of death. Table 3 illustrates the gap in service use between individuals with and without PA without any regression adjustment.
Individuals receiving PA have higher service use than those without PA across each of the five measurements. However, the ranges of the overall, between, and within standard deviations are wider for individuals with PA, and thus, we do not observe statistically significant gaps. In addition, the mean total number of months (T-bar) appears to be 5 months longer for individuals receiving PA than for those without it. Table 4 reports the magnitude of moral hazard in LTCI, that is, whether and how much service use increases when the copayment rate is reduced from 10% to zero. The results are robust across the three matching methods. Thus, we then focus on the findings based on the sample after NN1 matching without replacement. "Margin" stands for the marginal effect, and "non-PA" stands for the level-transformed predicted values for individuals without PA. At first glance, all margins are positive and significant (expect for those of cost per service day), indicating that individuals with PA tend to use more care, ceteris paribus. Specifically, those receiving PA have 9.8% higher monthly long-term care costs than those of individuals without PA, which are 104.06 thousand yen on average, corresponding to a price elasticity of − 0.10 and an absolute increase by 10.20 thousand yen. Quantitatively, those receiving PA use a 10.6% wider range of services than do those without PA, who use 1.68 types of services on average, and they use services 11.2% more frequently than do those without PA, who have 19.25 service days on average. The corresponding magnitudes are absolute increases of 0.18 service types and 2.6 service days per month, respectively. Qualitatively, the increases (absolute) in costs per service type and service day are 5.4% (3.3 thousand yen) and 4.9% (0.3 thousand yen), respectively, which are fairly moderate and less statistically significant. For robustness, we conduct FE estimations using the pre-matching sample (see Appendix D). Doing so notably underestimates each of the estimators, probably owing the SES imbalance across the two groups. We also apply simple linear regression to the post-matching sample (see Appendix E) and verify robustness in terms of magnitudes and statistical significance.
Magnitude of moral hazard
Moral hazard by specific cause of death
Next, we stratify the estimations across specific causes of death to test the heterogeneous increase in service use across individuals with different health risk levels. Table 5 summarizes the number of observations for each cause of death and the corresponding proportions at the insured and insured-month levels, respectively. Statistics for individuals receiving PA are in parentheses.
Among the four categories, pneumonia is the most recorded cause of death (n), and it is also the most documented in the claims (N). For the least recorded cause of death, myocardial infarction, the number of claims is still sufficient for estimation. The proportional statistics for those receiving PA are fairly close to those for the full sample, Table 4 Magnitude of moral hazard "Margin" stands for the marginal effect, and "non-PA" stands for the predicted values of individuals without PA and is level transformed (i.e., the exponential of the predicted value). The estimates are based on post-matching samples with (weighted) FE regressions. Monthly long-term care costs, monthly costs per service type, and monthly costs per service day are natural logarithm scaled, and the total types of services used per month and total service days per month are examined using an FE negative binomial model. The results adjusted for gender, care level, monthly most-used service type, cause of death, marital status at death, work status, location, operation, and anatomy. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively NN1, no replacement (n = 25,980) NN1 with replacement (n = 17,150) NN5 (n = 34,548) which, in turn, underscores the balance of the post-matching sample (even though the cause of death is not included in PSM). Table 6 shows the cause-specific moral hazard after regression adjustments. In this analysis, we consider variations across health risk levels. First, for individuals without PA, the predicted values of all measurements are greater for those who died by cerebral or myocardial infarction than for those who died by senility. Thus, even for those without PA, service use is greater when health conditions are more severe. Accordingly, we focus on percentage increases hereinafter, because a larger absolute increase does not necessarily imply greater moral hazard. The increases in monthly costs are about 12% in the cerebral infarction and myocardial infarction panels, which are much larger than the 8.5% observed for senility, and the increase in pneumonia is somewhere in between. The pattern is consistent for quantitative aspects. For instance, individuals receiving PA who died from cerebral or myocardial infarctions used 10-11% more service types than their non-PA counterparts did, whereas the corresponding difference is only 3.9% for those who died from senility. Finally, we observe no significant differences in qualitative aspect (i.e., the cost per type of service and cost per service day) for any disease-specific panel.
Discussion
Moral hazard is an issue thoroughly evaluated in the context of HI [2] . Several studies also investigate it in the context of private LTCI markets [5] . In this study, we build on the literature by demonstrating that a public LTCI market also encounters moral hazard. Using LTCI claims for 120 months linked to concurrent death records form vital statistics, we implement FE estimations based on a sample of insured individuals who copay 10% and zero of their fees constructed using PSM. The resulting increase in long-term care service use is 9.8%, which is equivalent to a 10.20-thousandyen increase per month, when the copayment rate falls by ten percentage points. Considering number of claims with zero copayments (148,372), this increase corresponds to an increase in public expenditure of approximately 1.513 billion yen (US$ 13.4 million). This magnitude is fairly small relative to the 10.4-trillion-yen public LTCI expenditure in 2016 [9], but it is not trivial given the current rapid global aging process and the potential expansion of the LTCI market.
Although we expect to observe substantial moral hazard in the LTCI market, the moderate magnitude is in line with previous findings for HI markets, indicating that the demand for long-term care is price inelastic. In the United States, the Rand HIE finds a price elasticity of medical spending of − 0.2 [23] , and the Oregon HIE finds a 39% increase in the list charges of treated individuals [22] . In Japan, studies also provide convincing evidence that the demand for healthcare is price insensitive, with calculated price elasticities ranging from − 0.06 [31] to − 0.18 [32] . The price elasticity of − 0.10 in Japan's public LTCI market is overall lower than the findings for HI in the United States and falls within the calculated range in Japan. Thus, frailty and cautiousness do not necessarily give rise to greater service demand among Japanese elderly, probably because the services eventually consumed are not solely attributable to individuals' personal preference but rather are also determined by their household compositions and the characteristics of their informal caregivers [26] . This result also indicates that the predictability of the long-term care demand enables insurers to properly control the amount of service provision by establishing a service plan beforehand.
Moreover, the increase in public LTCI expenditure captured by this study is not necessarily a loss of social welfare. According to Nyman [33] , only pure reactions to price changes should be counted in determining the welfare loss from moral hazard. Put differently, any increases in service use that stem from an income effect, that is, improvements in service accessibility due to an increase in real income, should be explicitly incorporated. Unfortunately, our data sets include neither household nor individual income, and even though we seek to balance the SES gap across PA eligibility using PSM, the increase in service use may The statistics are provided for the sample after NN1 matching without replacement. The ICD-10 is used for categorization, as follows: Pneumonia (J189), Senility (R54), Cerebral Infarction (I693, I639, I619, I691, I609), and Myocardial Infarction (I219, I252, I210 ). The frequency (N/n) and proportion (%) for individuals receiving PA are given in parentheses. % indicates the proportion of each disease among all possible causes of death still be attributable to better service access. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the income effect could be trivial in this case because the government intentionally sets uniform service prices for long-term care at moderate levels to ensure that citizens have equitable access [9] . 15 Supplier-induced demand is another unobserved driver of greater service use. Because care plans are commonly renewed quarterly or semiannually, service suppliers may suggest that individuals with PA expand their care use when they (re)construct their plans. 16 Additionally, care managers who are employed by either non-profit or for-profit service providers may have incentives to induce demand for care. However, doing so is fairly risky for suppliers and care managers, as municipalities may rescind designations and impose monetary penalties if made aware of foul play.
Digging deeper, the increase in service use is largely attributable to the quantitative aspects. This finding is intuitive because the government has prices perfectly under control. Accordingly, individuals can hardly distinguish the qualities of suppliers or services based on the out-ofpocket price. In fact, they typically select suppliers based on convenience (e.g., distance to the supplier) and perceived quality [35] . It is even more difficult for individuals to differentiate the implicit qualities after being transferred to the zero copayment scheme because all services become free. Instead, the quantitative aspects are more relevant as individuals can simply expand the types or volumes of services that they utilize.
By stratifying the estimations across different causes of death, we find that the magnitude of moral hazard varies across disease-specific groups. The increase in service use is considerably larger for those who die of cerebral (myocardial) infarction than for those who die of senility. The finding has two interpretations with contrary implications. If sufficient long-term care services are provided regardless of the copayment rate and disease severity (i.e., there is no excess demand), the larger increase is purely attributable to moral hazard. Instead, however, because cerebral (myocardial) Table 6 Moral hazard by specific cause of death "Margin" stands for the marginal effect, and "non-PA" stands for predicted values for individuals without PA and is level transformed (i.e., the exponential of the predict value). The estimations are based on post-matching samples with (weighted) FE regressions. Monthly long-term care costs, monthly costs per service type, and monthly costs per service day are natural logarithm scaled; total types of services used per month and total service days per month are examined using FE negative binomial model. The results are adjusted for gender, care level, monthly mostused service type, cause of death, marital status at death, work status, location, operation, and anatomy. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 15 According to a report of a public awareness investigation of healthcare and long-term care in 2017 [34] , 40% of respondents aged 65 and over think that the copayment rate is "very low" or "low," 28.7% say "neither low or high," and 7.9% consider the rate to be "very high." The corresponding rates for those younger than 65 are 29.8%, 37.9%, and 9.7%, respectively. The report concludes that the higher rate of "neither low or high" among the younger cohort is attributable to the lower prevalence of long-term care use therein (so that they do not know the costs). More importantly, the higher rates of "very low" and "low" among the older cohort show that, even for those who are much more likely to use the services, the cost sharing is moderate. 16 We observe a rather long period of service use (i.e., 120 months), during which individuals might be induced to re-construct their care plans.
infarction commonly causes more difficulties in daily life than senility does [36] , the result may imply excess service demand among the former cohort. In this case, at least part of the larger increase is a result of the new equilibrium realized by the reduced copayment rate, and whether moral hazard is larger among individuals suffering from cerebral (myocardial) infarction depends on the magnitude of this excess demand. In either case, however, it is noteworthy that cerebral (myocardial) infarction induces larger service use than the senility does. Regarding the health risks behind these diseases [27] , it appears that the riskier the ex-ante health behaviors are, the higher the ex-post demand for long-term care should be. This notion is in line with previous findings of positive associations between ex-ante health risks (e.g., increases in body mass index) and service use in public HI markets [17] and may be an evidence for evaluating potential health risks in insurance systems with mandatory enrollment.
However, it is essential to clarify the motivation behind individuals' tendencies toward riskier behavior under mandatory enrollment. In most instances, individuals do not intended to take more health risks for the purpose of more service utilization, but mandatorily enrollment may lower their willingness to perform good health self-management, and such behavior eventually results in more intensive service use. Thus, policies to promote preventative health care programs among young and middle-aged individuals are indispensable in the case of public LTCI (HI).
Conclusion
Fiscal sustainability has been one of the greatest concerns faced by Japan's LTCI 18 years after its introduction. This study verifies the possibility of cost-sharing adjustments as one solution for the soaring public LTCI expenditure. Increased copayment rates could moderately restrain longterm care service use. Our findings may have broad implications for the rapidly aging world by providing valuable evidence for governments planning to launch public LTCI. These results can also be used as a reference for evaluating private LTCI.
However, this study has several limitations, mainly owing to unobserved factors. PSM balances the covariates observed in the data, but unobserved covariates remain in the post-matching sample. Although the FE model further eliminates unobserved and time-invariant factors, covariates that vary over time (e.g., marital status) remain uncontrolled. The time-variant and unobserved factors may yield over-or underestimations. Data limitations also prevent us from applying more plausible identification methods (e.g., IV or regression discontinuity) because household income-the key criterion for PA eligibility-is unobservable. Similarly, we use cause of death to classify ex-ante health risks because a more accurate indicator-the major disease leading to long-term care eligibility-is unobservable. By analyzing administrative data, researchers benefit from less sample selection and less measurement error, but socio-demographic statuses are highly limited within one specific administrative dataset. Hence, a broader linkage of Japan's administrative and survey data is necessary to utilize better identification strategies.
Finally, a potential sample selection issue arises because we exclude individuals who are right censored at the end of the observational period to acquire information from the death records. Thus, our sample overrepresents individuals who die relatively quick after becoming eligible for LTCI. This issue may lead to underestimation or overestimation because individuals who die quickly may require more intensive care than censored individuals. In addition, only those who are matched successfully by PSM remain for FE estimations, indicating that our results may not be generalizable to a cohort with characteristics notably different from those of the matched sample in the range of common support. Specifically, our findings may not be applicable to individuals with high SES (i.e., wealthy individuals) because PSM retains individuals without PA with similar characteristics to those with PA. Thus, further studies using a longer observation period and more comprehensive covariates are necessary to clarify our results.
